**Resilience and Crisis Module**

* Managing unexpected, Karl E.Weick, Kathleen M.Sutcliffe, Wiley, 2015
  + Anticipation and resilience required to manage unexpected events. These two is called **mindful organizing.**
  + Organizations like this are called high reliability organizations. (HRO)
  + Managing unexpected is an ongoing effort to define and monitor weak signals of potentially big threats and to take adaptive action. Those weak signals begin to cristallize into more complex chains of unintended consequences.
  + Weak signals are hard to detect but easy to remedy and vice versa.
  + HROs manages unexpected by;
    - Preoccupation with failure (to detect signals):
      * Directs attention to ways in which local activities can conceal.
      * Hightlight symptoms of system malfunction.
    - Reluctance to simplify:
      * Simplify to focus handful issues
      * But less simplification allows to see in detail what might be causing unexpected.
      * HROs take deliberate steps to create more complete pictures of what they face.
      * WaMu: Treating all subprime borrowers similar.
    - Sensitivity to operations:
      * Anomalies are noticed while they are still tractable and can still be isolated and dealt with.
      * It is about the work itself, about seeing what we are actually doing regardless of intentions and plans.
      * Differences in sensitivity in close calls: when you take it serious performance increase, vice versa.
    - Resilience
      * The essence of resilience is the intrinsic ability of an organization (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which allows it to continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the presence of a continuous stress. Erik Hollnagel, “Resilience: The Challenge of the Unstable,” in Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts, ed. Erik Hollnagel, David Woods, and Nancy Leveson (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 9–18, see 16.
      * HROs develop capalities to detect, contain, and bounce back from these inevitable errors.
    - Expertise

**Crisis and Resilience in National Security**

Dr Caroline Micklewright (Lecturer in Defence Leadership and Management)

**Human Security and National Security Strategies (BW)**

Professor Bryan Watters (Professor of Defence Leadership)

**Human Security: United Nations Case Study (1)**

**Human Security: United Nations Case Study (2) (BW)**

**The Bargaining Model of War and Conflict: An India-Pakistan Case Study (IZ)**

Dr Iftikhar Zaidi (Senior Lecturer in Leadership and Strategy)

* **Exploring the Bargaining Model of War, By Dan Reiter, 2003**
  + Model envisions the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war as part of a single bargaining process (27).
  + It views international politics as disputes over scarce goods. So, states use both war and words as bargaining tools to achieve optimal allocations of goods. It sees war as politics all the way down, as a continuation of bargaining (as negotiations during war, and war ends when a deal is struck) rather than breakdown of diplomacy. (27)
  + It is used to explain the resolution of conflict among actors. When some good or resource must be divided among at least two actors, bargaining is “the process of arriving at mutual agreement on the provisions of a contract (Kennan and Wilson 1993, Bargaining with private info). (28)
  + War is continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz). This view fits into a bargaining perspective. In modern bargaining-model scholarship, this logic gets translated into the critical assumption that war itself—the actual fighting, aside from the political issues at stake—is always costly.
  + The Clausewitz’s premise that wars are frequently limited rather than total laid the groundwork for developing a modern bargaining model of war: if wars are rarely total, then they usually end with a war terminating bargain rather than with one side’s decisive military defeat. (28)
  + Economist Thomas Schelling was one of the first modern social scientists to frame conflict as bargaining, (“most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations.”, p.5) using mostly informal discussion and early noncooperative game theory ((Schelling, 1980, p. 5). (28) In those years scholars trying to explain start and end of war in terms of bargaining process in informal ways.
  + Formal ways, 1980s: as part of rational-choice models of politics and war.
  + Start of war: Rational-war is deliberate act to optimize gains vs. psychologists -perceptual biases and miscalculations.
    - Mesquita-Rational explanations of war: war occurs when states prefer war to peace (1981, ).
    - Fearon, 1995: Rationalist explanation of war.
    - These are explaining start of a war in bargaining terms, but they say outcome is random draw. They say winner side cannot win so much because war dips everything.
  + Post-1995: This newer scholarship views both the start and the end of wars[[1]](#footnote-1) as part of the bargaining process, explicitly relaxing the assumption that war is a costly lottery.

**Actors and Security (BW) The Buncefield Fire Case Study**

1. For Clausewitz there are 3 reasons for peace; şnabşlşty to carry on struggle, improbability of victory, and unaccaptable cost. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)